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Abstract 
This paper argues that the exercise of the imagination requires us 1) to attempt to describe 
features of a certain practice that appear, at first blush, natural and obvious; 2) to understand 
that that which appears natural and obvious could be otherwise; and 3) to be open to the 
introduction of changes to that which appears natural and obvious. Imagination, in this sense, 
is quite different to creativity. The latter works on the basis of the introduction of variations to 
settled phenomena. This exercise of creativity is important, but ultimately, it contributes 
principally to the stability and identity of a community and reinforces its most firmly 
established features. Imagination, on the other hand, is more difficult, for it strikes at the very 
heart of that which is settled. Changes to that which is settled may not only be resisted, but 
may also be violently opposed. And yet, it is precisely the very ability and willingness to be 
open to such changes that may be of the most ethical and political significance. These 
differences between creativity and imagination are illustrated in the context of the practice of 
philosophy.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt occasionally refers to the thoughtlessness of 
Eichmann as “the lack of imagination.”
1
 In subsequent work, Arendt returned again and again 
to the ethical and political significance of thoughtfulness – as she does, for example, in her 
paper, “Thinking and Moral Considerations”
2
 and in the first volume of The Life of the Mind.
3
 
In the former, Arendt explores the character of Socrates as a paradigmatic example of 
thoughtfulness. Putting to one side exegetical issues concerning Arendt’s understanding of 
thoughtfulness,
4
 her discussion raises the following question: how thoughtful, how 
imaginative, is the practice of philosophy? The aim of this paper is to offer an answer to that 
question, but in doing so, not to attempt to offer an accurate picture of the practice of 
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 2 
philosophy,
5
 but rather, to use the context of the practice of philosophy in order to explore 
what we may expect from the exercise of the imagination. As we shall see, such an 
exploration may also help us to understand the differences between the exercise of 
imagination and creativity.  
The paper proceeds in five brief parts. The first four parts introduce what is called here 
the four layers of the practice of philosophy: first, the outer-outer layer; second, the neo-outer 
layer; third, the neo-inner layer; and fourth, the inner-inner layer. The outer-outer layer refers 
to the environments and tools thanks to which and in the context of which persons are 
emotionally involved in certain common or joint objects. The neo-outer layer is characterised 
by a repertoire of gestures developed at least partly in the environments and tools of the outer-
outer layer. The focus of the third layer, the neo-inner, is on four elements of philosophical 
thinking: first, the reliance on intuition-contexts; second, the transcendental ambition; third, 
ideal-dialectical dynamics; and fourth, the exercise and camouflage of hindsight. The fourth 
layer, the inner-inner, is comprised of the substance and content of arguments and problems. 
Such is the program for the first four parts of the paper. Space constraints mean that the paper 
but sketches each of the layers and their respective components.  
The fifth and final part argues that although there is both a need and an opportunity for 
creativity in the inner-inner layer of philosophical practice, the exercise of the imagination is 
characterised by the ability and willingness to 1) to attempt to describe that which, at first 
blush, appears natural and obvious; 2) to understand that that which appears natural and 
obvious could be otherwise; and 3) to be open to the introduction of changes to that which 
appears natural and obvious. In other words, exclusive reliance on the creativity needed and 
produced in the inner-inner layer will not, by itself, allow us to consider the practice of 
philosophy as imaginative. In order to be imaginative, the practice of philosophy must at the 
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very least offer the possibility for changes to the first three layers. If we expect anything less 
from the exercise of the imagination, we run the risk of the practice of philosophy becoming 
ever more incapable of seeing the limitations of any one form in which it is practiced, and 
becoming ever more defensive and perhaps aggressive in response to changes that challenge 
the form in which it is practiced.  
Put more generally, what was missing from Eichmann, and what seeks to be countered 
by the exercise of the imagination (as presented here), is precisely openness to an awareness 
of one’s own limitations – to a great extent influenced by the environments, tools, 
embodiments and habits of thinking within which one acts and develops – and thus also an 
ability and willingness to confront the often unintended consequences of one’s actions and 
change one’s own ways of life. Creativity, at least as presented here, turns out to operate 
under a contrary dynamic, i.e., in offering variations on familiar themes, creativity reinforces 
the identity of persons, and increases the barriers that outsiders need to cross in order to 
become insiders. Although such reinforcement of identity, and such stabilisation of relations 
and expectations amongst persons is sometimes needed, there is an ever-present danger, 
particularly when such groups become powerful, that those outside it will be seen as, and 
treated as, unwelcome threats to the status quo.  
 
I. The Outer-Outer Layer 
Consider the following environments: a pub showing a football game and a philosophy 
seminar. In both scenarios, participants are emotionally involved in a joint or common object. 
In the case of the pub, the eyes and ears of most, if not all, persons are on the many screens 
scattered throughout the pub (a common object), or, perhaps, on one big screen (a joint 
object), listening to and watching the game. In the case of the philosophy seminar, the eyes 
and ears of most, if not all, persons are on the person giving the seminar.  
 4 
There is emotional involvement in two different ways. First, there is the obvious 
emotional involvement in the result of the game or in the argument. That is not the kind of 
emotional involvement of interest here. The second kind, relevant for present purposes, is that 
of emotional involvement in the common or joint object such that, were there to be any 
interference in the capacity of persons to see and hear the game, or see and hear the argument, 
one could expect an expression, sometimes violent, of emotional disapprobation.  
 It is easy to forget that human beings are not born with the capacity for joint attention, 
i.e., the capacity to pay attention to a joint object.
6
 But it not the physiological or 
developmental level that is of relevance presently. Rather, what is significant here is how the 
environment itself is structured to facilitate the exercise of our capacity for joint attention. In 
the case of the pub, reference has already been made to the scattering of television screens, or 
the prominent positioning of one big screen. In the case of the seminar, it is pertinent to notice 
the arrangement of the table and the seats, and the positioning of the speaker at a spot of 
maximum visibility and audibility for all. Joint attention is facilitated even more obviously in 
the case of a lecture theatre, sometimes to the extent that the mass of students sits in the dark, 
while the lecturer is bathed in the glory of a spotlight. And, of course, we could hardly 
conceive of a more dramatic ritualisation of joint attention than the football stadium.  
 Of course, we can speak of many other kinds of philosophical spaces. At one extreme, 
one can consider the effects of the differences between university campuses collected or 
scattered within the city, and those on the outskirts of a major city or those forming their own 
little university village. At the other, one can look at the design of office spaces, and ask 
oneself, for example, why it is that it is very rare, if it has ever occurred at all, for a 
philosophy department to have an open office environment. Somewhere in between these two 
extremes, one can look to see if those with offices closer together, and thus those more likely 
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to interact more frequently, are already grouped in terms of research areas, or, if not, whether 
new research areas emerge from those more frequent interactions. One can look, further, at 
the design of any one individual office, lined with books (rather than, say, paintings), quiet, 
overlooking rooftops, and containing a computer screen and keyboard fighting for space with 
various half-open books and papers.   
 The important point to make here is that environments tend to be, on the whole, 
largely invisible to philosophers, and yet, simultaneously, and perhaps precisely because of 
this, highly influential. Their causal efficacy is notoriously difficult to convey, but their 
influence may be glimpsed when alternatives are considered. In other words, the successful 
functioning of these environments is dependent on their being taken for granted; on not yet 
even being recognised as obvious and natural; such that the possibility of them being different 
does not even arise as a question, let alone one in which the participants might take an active 
interest. Reference has already been made to the lack of open office space in philosophy 
departments, but one can consider other alternatives that would, potentially, facilitate different 
kinds of interaction and expression. Further examples shall feature in the fifth part of the 
paper.  
 The outer-outer layer is comprised not only of environments, but also tools. Again, 
one can be more or less telescopic in one’s observations here. In the case of the seminar, for 
example, one can notice obvious material instruments, such as a blackboard, or a laptop and 
projector. But one can also pay attention to other forms, e.g., the form of a handout to be 
distributed prior to or during a presentation; or the form of a PowerPoint presentation – 
indeed, as for the latter, it may be pertinent to ask why, for example, some philosophers may 
feel their ideas are more easily presentable in the form of bullet points than others, or why 
those philosophers who do use PowerPoint nevertheless rarely use diagrams or images. One 
can also look at other forms, outside of the environment of the seminar, such as the forms of 
 6 
articles (to be of a certain length, written in a certain tone, appropriately supported by 
references), the forms of books, the forms of reviews – all of which one can characterise as 
tools of expression – as well as tools of composition, such as the use of a computer and 
keyboard and their effects on philosophical expression.
7
 As with environments, philosophers 
may get so used to the tools they use that they do not ever come to consider how these tools 
might be affecting their philosophical output, or what would happen should they use 
alternative tools for either composition or expression. Once again, some alternatives will be 
considered in the fifth part of the paper. 
 One common thread that runs throughout the various different kinds of environments 
and tools used in philosophy departments is the facilitation and endorsement of solitude. 
Although some philosophy departments offer more opportunities for interaction than others, 
the typical and not wholly inaccurate image of philosophical practice is of the lonely 
philosopher, wrestling with, say, the never-ending perplexities of language. Indeed, it is not 
uncontroversial to suggest that it is likely that the greatest part of a contemporary 
philosopher’s life will be spent alone before a computer. In previous times, papers stacked up 
on a simple table illuminated by candlelight replaced the contemporary computer. In short, 
whether looking back with grief and remorse,
8
 peering into oneself for the source of one’s 
knowledge of wax burning,
9
 or waking up each day to face oneself in the mirror of nature,
10
 
solitude is a staple diet for the philosopher. Indeed, so protected, so highly prised, is this time 
filled with one’s own self that one may speculate whether or not it is linked with the long-
standing interest, if not obsession, of philosophy with self-consciousness, self-knowledge, 
identity, deliberation, reason, and decision-making. What else could seem more insightful for 
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a philosopher than more reflection on reflection? And what else could seem more valuable 
than the life examined, i.e., the life already led by philosophers?  
 As noted above, alleging causal relations between environments and tools and 
philosophical output is difficult and highly speculative. The point, in any event, of this part of 
the paper is not to point to any such causal relations, or even to raise the likelihood of a link 
between the environments and tools of the philosophical life and the tendency to focus on 
certain problems and look for certain insights. Rather, it is to point those environments and 
tools, and thereby also suggest that there are alternatives to them. If such an exercise is seen 
to be as uninteresting, or worse, offensive, by the philosopher, then that response may in itself 
tell us something about the tenacity of these environments and tools.  
 
II. The Neo-Outer Layer 
Attending a recent seminar given by a philosopher to other philosophers, an observer who 
focuses on the speaker’s facial expressions and gestures may very well notice the following: 
when thinking, the speaker looks up into the air, sometimes also narrowing his eyes (squinting 
as if to signify that he is thinking something difficult). Should such an observer attend many 
seminars given by philosophers to other philosophers, she may very well notice a good many 
incidents of such a gesture. Indeed, such an observer may notice a whole repertoire of 
gestures and facial expressions, and she may not take long to consider the possibility that 
these gestures and facial expressions are recognisably philosophical, common to communities 
of philosophers. The suggestion of this part of the paper is that these gestures and expressions 
are equally part of philosophical practice, and are equally as important as, say, environments 
and tools, or, as we shall see in a moment, features of philosophical thinking or the content of 
arguments.  
 8 
The neo-outer layer, however, should not be restricted to hand gestures and facial 
expressions. In a similar way to the case of environments and tools, it is precisely those things 
that we have not yet thought of as gestures that may be the most influential, and most difficult 
to shake off. An example from football may help bring out this notion of a heretofore 
invisible gesture. Return, for a moment, to the pub showing the football match. Imagine that a 
player in the match misses an excellent opportunity for scoring. He gets down on his knees. 
His hands clasp his head. He tilts his head back and rolls his eyes. He swears. These are all 
gestures we expect from players who miss such chances. Not only do we ourselves often fail 
to see these as gestures, i.e., as identifiable entities capable of being separated from the whole 
incident of a missed opportunity in football, but they also seem natural to us, and perhaps 
even more so the footballer. How is that there is so much uniformity in the comportment of a 
missed opportunity in football? Could there be, by analogy, a comportment of doubt, a 
comportment of thinking, a comportment of philosophising? Consider, too, the possibility that 
language is, at bottom, not something abstract – a tool of communication – but primarily a 
performance of one’s body. If there is a technical philosophical language, might one also say 
there is a technical philosophical body? 
 Much has, of course, been written about the body as a neglected locus of knowledge, 
and equally, about the questionable primacy given to certain senses in the expression and 
transmission of knowledge, such as the dominance of the sense of sight as a philosophical 
metaphor.
11
 Rarely, it seems, has this been traced to the practice of philosophy.
12
 Even 
Dewey, who spoke of his astonishment at not being able to sit down when instructed to do so 
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in a particular way,
13
 did not consider how bodily habits might affect philosophical practice. 
The importance of the body figures not only in, though may be most dramatic in, the case of 
the exercise of philosophical practice, i.e., in how we communicate philosophical ideas, e.g., 
the fact that we do so by writing and speaking, rather than say, miming or passing pictures to 
each other or sculpting. Its importance also lies in the lack, in most philosophers, of any kind 
of bodily flexibility of the kind that Dewey did speak of.
14
 Indeed, this silencing of the many 
potentialities of the body may itself be as much as a source of the long-standing philosophical 
celebration of the cerebral, and the correlative primacy given to the deliberative in 
explanations of behaviour (e.g., by granting causal power to reasons), as the persuasiveness of 
any argument. In this respect, one could speculate that the silencing of the body and the 
alleged bias in favour of the cerebral, is analogous to the causal relation speculated on above 
between the facilitation and encouragement of solitude in the environments and tools of the 
philosophical life and the tendency to celebrate the importance of self-reliance, or self-control 
(e.g., rational control over one’s emotions or desires), and the so-called rational liberation of 
the individual from the traditionality of a society.  
Once again, the causal relations between forms of the philosophical body and 
philosophical pictures, arguments or biases are not easily drawn; nor is that the focus here. 
What is more important here is the very process of identifying features or characteristics of 
the philosophical body and thereby opening up the possibility for changing them. We can gain 
the most powerful insights into the philosophical body when we consider alternatives; when 
we widen, in short, the realm of possible philosophical bodies. Consider, for example, the 
possibility of philosophical ideas being communicated by way of miming or passing pictures 
or sculpting. What does the consideration of such a possibility tell us about the philosophical 
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body? How do philosophers respond to such a suggestion? What does that reveal about the 
tenacity, the pull of gravity, of bodily habits?  
 
III. The Neo-Inner Layer 
The focus of the neo-inner layer is on philosophical thinking. The four features of 
philosophical thinking, to be discussed below in this order, are: first, the reliance on intuition-
contexts; second, the transcendental ambition; third, ideal-dialectical dynamics; and fourth, 
the exercise and camouflage of hindsight. All of these features are closely related and only 
artificially divided. Again, given space restrictions, each of them can only be sketched very 
briefly. Further, no evidence will be offered for asserting them as features of philosophical 
thinking. Rather, they are offered as observations not for their own sakes, but for the sake of 
understanding what we may expect of the imagination in the practice of philosophy.  
 
IIIA. Intuition-Contexts 
Intuition-contexts are stocks of common examples often used to illustrate, buttress, or 
motivate intuitions. These can be thought of as mini-stories, or typical narrative images, in 
which the intuitions at play in certain communities of arguments or problems feel at home.  
To illustrate this feature of philosophical thinking, a good deal of exegetical work 
would need to be done. One way in which this could be done would be to take some of the 
most often cited or most often taught texts of, say, the contemporary analytical philosophy of 
action and to point to the alleged common features of typical examples. These, it might be 
thought, would involve ex-ante, first-person, short-term action, rather than ex-post, third-
person, long-term activities.
15
 Another way to approach the task would be to take the concept 
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or problem of intentionality and to show how this concept or problem has emerged from the 
repetition of certain examples, e.g., examples in which there are already articulated rules 
about how someone ought to proceed, with the only question left over being whether they are 
following them, or why they should follow them. Yet another strategy would be to take a 
debate, e.g., the debate over the extent to which, and in what circumstances, intentional action 
is accompanied by awareness or consciousness, and to situate this debate within, once again, 
the recurring examples, e.g., games (e.g., chess) where some set of rules is said to be 
constitutive, and where the debate oscillates between the example of the beginner and the 
expert (the former’s intentionality said to be accompanied by awareness or consciousness, and 
the other’s not).
16
 A final strategy would be to consider the effect of new examples on some 
philosophical debate, the most dramatic of which, in recent times, was the tremor felt among 
epistemologists confronted by the Gettier cases.  
The important point in all of this is to suggest the primacy of recurring images, from 
which various kinds of arguments, problems, concepts, positions or debates emerge and 
around which they oscillate. Recognising this feature, in other words, is recognising that 
images are not mere illustrations of abstract principles (i.e., that they are not ‘mere’ examples, 
even if we call them that), but that abstract principles emerge from recurring images, as 
supplemented, perhaps, by one’s own experiences. In short, and counter-intuitively, it may be 
more accurate to say that it is the abstract principles that are the examples for the recurring 
images.  
 
IIIB. The Transcendental Ambition 
The transcendental ambition consists in the construction of philosophical pictures out of 
conditions thanks to which the author of those conditions hopes to be able to evaluate the 
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rightness or wrongness (whether from a political, ethical, epistemic, social, legal, or any other 
perspective) of an action or proposition. It has sometimes been thought that some 
philosophical thinking is characterised by the search for a definition.
17
 But, at least in light of 
the present feature, this does not get at the core of the issue, which is that the search for a 
definition is but one way of attempting to find a ground from which an evaluation of some 
action or proposition can proceed.  
Take any philosophical picture. Take, for instance, the debate over legal validity or 
moral objectivity, and consider whether any of the proposed answers to this problem do not 
proceed in such a fashion as to enable the author of the alleged criteria of validity or 
objectivity to evaluate whether this or that norm is valid or objective. Take the problem of 
political obligation: is this problem not seen to be resolved when the author is able to show 
that we can use his or her picture to evaluate whether, in these or those circumstances, a 
person is obliged to obey a directive of the government or not? Of course, in the context of 
the problem of political obligation, the answers will differ; some may place more or less 
reliance on, say, the circumstances in which authority is exercised, others on the content of 
the directive, or any number of other factors – indeed, in light of the first feature noted above, 
we could say that the relative reliance on any one of those is likely to be influenced by the 
typical images assumed or focused on by the author.  
More pertinently for present purposes, it is significant that, sooner or later, the 
‘success’ of some proposed stack of conditions is revealed to have been mistaken, i.e., there 
are always counter-examples that are, eventually, offered, such as to reveal some 
circumstances in which the conditions do not pick out some relevant difference.  
Finally, it is noteworthy to acknowledge that the transcendental ambition might appear 
too obvious to be worthy of being stated. For what other ambition can one discern from, say, a 
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theory of truth, except that it is designed to help us distinguish between true and false 
statements? In answer, it is worth repeating that, as with many of the features of the first three 
layers of philosophical practice, they all appear too obvious to be worth stating until and 
unless one proposes an alternative; until and unless, that is, one sees such features as 
contingent rather than necessary components of philosophical thinking.   
 
IIIC. Ideal-Dialectical Dynamics 
The ideal-dialectical dynamics of philosophical thinking – and also the third feature of the 
neo-inner layer – consists in the observation that philosophical work typically proceeds in the 
shadow of the horizon of a concept that is always receding and always being approached in 
the form of examples that fall short of reaching their destination. Put differently, one could 
assert that every philosophical thought is the pursuit of an ideal, and that this pursuit is never-
ending, for these are ideals, like all ideals, that are difficult, if not impossible, to think in 
themselves, and can be, perhaps only, or at least are typically, approached from the 
perspective of examples of that which they are not.  
The idea that philosophical thinking needs ideals it can never satisfy ought not to be 
thought of as determined for all time. There is, in other words, no set list of ideals. The idea, 
rather, is that in any one case of philosophical thinking there is always some ideal (often 
grammatically positive, such as truth, beauty, goodness, validity, and so on) that is 
functioning in a way that cannot be exhausted, with the effect that philosophical thinking can, 
at best, amass examples of situations in which it is absent.  
It would be unclear, then, to say that philosophical thinking proceeds by dividing, 
distinguishing, classifying, and so on – in the same way that, as mentioned with respect to the 
previous feature, it is unclear to say that (some) philosophical thinking proceeds by way of 
definition. Rather, at any one time, an ideal is pursued; its explanation is sought; its pursuance 
 14 
emerges from an attempt to make sense of some typical recurring example or some 
experience assumed or taken to be paradigmatic; but its actual capture is impossible. To take 
but one example from this paper, the figure of the imagination could be understood to be 
treated as an ideal – the concept is being pursued and examples are being amassed of what 
imagination is not.  
One can think, if pressed, of this feature of philosophical thinking as the reverse of the 
previous one, i.e., that the impossibility to capture the ideal pursued by philosophical thinking 
is revealed in the always-available possibility of constructing counter-examples that show the 
transcendental ambition to have failed.  
Further, if one imagines the possibility of a philosophy of falsity, ugliness, invalidity 
and the bad, then one sees the importance of certain recurring examples in not only making 
intuitions feel at home, but also, with reference to this feature, driving the pursuit of that 
which is impossible to capture.  
 
IIID. The Exercise and Camouflage of Hindsight 
One way of illustrating the exercise and camouflage of hindsight – the fourth and final feature 
of philosophical thinking to be discussed here – is to consider the idea of there being an 
implicit order composed of implicit rules being observed in some activity, with the possibly 
self-serving consequence that a philosopher (and, typically, according to the philosopher, only 
a philosopher) is required to make the implicit rule(s) explicit.
18
  
What tends to be forgotten in such cases is that what can now be understood, in 
hindsight, as having led to the articulation of a rule, could not have been so understood prior 
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to the circumstances that led to that articulation. When that is forgotten, it becomes possible 
to offer an explanation – typically a causal story, whether comprised of reasons or emotions 
that moved the agent or some mechanisms that determined the agent’s behaviour – that takes 
advantage of the assumption that the rule was there all along. Such an explanation 
conveniently ignores our lack of attention to the alleged prior order, i.e., our not yet having 
even conceived it as an order. Indeed, one can state this feature more strongly: all stories, 
whether they tend to prioritise the involvement of the will of the agent or not (whether they do 
tends to depend, once again, on the typical examples from which such stories emerge), are 
constructed with the benefit of hindsight. Further, the appeal to an implicit order, or a set of 
rules said to have been implicitly followed, may also be understood as a move aimed at 
legitimating the practice of evaluating the action or proposition the rule addresses – otherwise 
the imposition of a new rule places stress on a justification for the exercise of the power to 
evaluate.  
It is notoriously difficult to offer examples of this fourth feature of philosophical 
thinking, for any example of a rule being alleged to be implicit is already one that has 
benefited from the first instance of a ‘break’ from the ‘usual’ run of things to which persons 
have reacted with disapprobation.
19
 One can approach this feature by contrasting the 
commentary that one hears live in a football game with the commentary one hears in the 
break at half-time when the game is subject to an analysis consisting not only of events 
already understood in light of the entire half, but also thanks to various kinds of arrows and 
other technical gimmicks that ‘reveal’ patterns in the play of the two sides – those being 
‘patterns’ visible only in hindsight. A similar illustration is provided by the contrast between 
live and ex-post commentary to chess games.  
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An illustration at a different level might help here. There is a peculiar kind of chess 
puzzle known as the retrograde puzzle.
20
 One solves it not by attempting to find the best move 
from the current position, but rather, by reconstructing the last few moves that led to the 
current position. Typically, there is only one such reconstruction possible. The exercise and 
camouflage of hindsight may be analogous in the sense that it is as if all philosophical 
thinking expressed itself in the form of solutions to retrograde puzzles, and, in doing so, 
avoided the difficulties associated with explaining what goes on when a solution is sought to 
be found from the current position. Indeed, the point can be put even more strongly, for in a 
real chess game, a player not only must find the best move to continue, but he or she also does 
not know, and cannot know, whether the position is like that of a problem that can be solved, 
or more like a situation where there are numerous equally good moves.  
The above, then, are but quick sketches of four features of philosophical thinking. 
There are others one could mention, e.g., the tendency to rely on the excess of meaning (the 
excess of ambiguity) in terms such as necessity, possibility, is, ought, can, and others;
21
 or the 
tendency to create philosophical pictures by finding a middle point between what one 
understands or characterises as excesses in the relevant literature; or the tendency to see as an 
insight only that which confirms that which one already finds insightful;
22
 and others. Indeed, 
there are no doubt an infinite number of features that could be ‘identified.’ In any event, the 
point of the above four features, to reiterate, is not to accurately describe or, worse, attempt to 
exhaust, the characteristics of philosophical thinking. The point, instead, is to offer some no 
doubt inadequate and speculative observations – from a distance somewhat removed from the 
detail of philosophical work – such as to open up the very possibility of change.  
                                                
20
 A recent discussion of these puzzles appears in Graeffrath, Bernd, “To Know the Past One Must First Know 
the Future: Raymond Smullyan and the Mysteries of Retrograde Analysis” in Hale, Benjamin (ed), Philosophy 
Looks at Chess, Chicago: Open Court, 2008, 1-12.  
21
 This point is made by Wittgenstein in Culture and Value, Oxford: Blackwell, 1980, at 15e.  
22
 See, De Man, Paul, Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism, 2
nd
 ed, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983. 
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IV. The Inner-Inner Layer 
The fourth and final layer of philosophical practice is that of the content or substance of 
philosophical problems and arguments. It is introduced last because it tends to be projected, 
typically by philosophers, as not only the most important, but indeed as philosophy itself. In 
other words, philosophy itself, it is typically thought, is the realm of philosophical beliefs or 
systems of beliefs, such as cognitivism in meta-ethics, or reliabilism in epistemology, or 
positivism in legal theory, or idealism in metaphysics. This very mode of self-identification 
by philosophers is of interest, though it shall not be dwelt on here. The point is that the inner-
inner layer tends to be overemphasised by philosophers themselves – hence the motivation in 
this paper to begin with and emphasise the first three layers.  
 Another observation in relation to the ordering of the layers needs to be made. 
Although at various times throughout the paper, speculations have been offered as to the 
possible causal relations between the first three layers and the fourth layer – e.g., the possible 
link between individual offices and, say, the focus on self-conscious knowledge by 
epistemologists – it is no part of the argument that the first three layers determine the content 
of the last layer. Nor is it part of the argument to suggest that the causal relation, if there is 
one, is always one way, i.e., that it cannot proceed from the fourth layer and go on to affect 
the other three layers. Nevertheless, it is the case that the inner-inner layer is offered last in 
order to suggest that it may be worthwhile for philosophers to consider what influence the 
features of the first three layers have on the tendency to focus on certain kinds of problems 
and offer certain kinds of insights in response to those problems. Even more provocatively, it 
is hoped that positioning the inner-inner layer last may spark consideration of the possibility 
that when philosophers speak of, say, rationality as the distinguishing feature of human 
beings, they are not speaking of all human beings, but that, instead, thay are speaking 
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primarily of philosophers. In other words, philosophers ought to consider the possibility that 
what they find problematic, interesting, insightful, worthy of consideration, debate and 
exploration is something that is limited by the characteristics of the first three layers, i.e., that 
it is, in effect, a form of reflection on the philosophical life, i.e., on a life composed of the 
kinds of environments and tools and corporeal and cerebral habits sketched in the first three 
parts.  
 Of course, even if the last observation was accurate – and it is not presented here in 
that tone – then it would not mean that the inner-inner layer is not important, or without its 
own kinds of effects on philosophers and the wider pool of citizens. Certainly, one can find 
instances of the inner-inner layer influencing the decisions of individuals, communities and 
governments. However, even here one must have the courage to be sceptical, for it is likely 
that philosophers themselves – and perhaps also many historians (depending on their 
methodologies) – will emphasise, possibly without realising it, the causal importance of ideas, 
thereby also confirming and reconfirming not only their self-conceptions, but also the 
importance of those self-conceptions.  
 Two further observations can be made with respect to this inner-inner layer. First, 
recall that when introducing the first layer, two kinds of emotional involvement were 
identified. The indirect was of interest in the case of the first layer – it invoked that sense of 
the frame that, when broken or disrupted, becomes visible and results in emotional 
disapprobation. In this layer, it is the more direct emotional involvement that is of interest. 
This latter kind of emotional involvement appears in reactions of approval or disapproval to 
certain ways of presenting recognisable, substantive, arguments or positions in philosophy. 
Some may feel, on any one occasion, that some positions are represented inadequately; 
important details skirted over; important distinctions not made; inaccurate citations selected; 
or that any other kinds of mistakes are made. The mutual disciplining that goes on in this 
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layer is visible and audible – indeed, the layer is permeated with overt and highly dramatic 
mutual evaluation.   
Secondly and finally, it needs to be pointed out that change is not only possible, but 
also, in some respects, necessary in this inner-inner layer. Most usually, change will come in 
the form of slight shifts in variation in an argument, which, if one accepts the first feature of 
philosophical thinking presented above, will themselves emerge from modest tweaking of the 
examples or counter-examples. Without such changes, or where such changes become 
difficult to introduce, because, say, of the highly developed stage of the argument – 
comprised of a thicket of variations on recurring images or examples, and brimming with 
conditions of increasing complexity and abstractness (e.g., the cognitivism versus non-
cognitivism debate in metaethics, or the positivism verses natural law debate in legal theory) 
– then the debate or area might begin to lose its standing as a so-called ‘hot issue’ or ‘cutting 
edge debate’ in philosophy, and simply die a kind of philosophical death. One can perhaps 
best see glimpses of these kinds of variations, as well as, these kinds of deaths, when perusing 
the debates of philosophical journals in the recent past (say, twenty to thirty years ago). In this 
way, then, creativity, or the introduction of variations into settled themes, will raise the costs 
of entry into the relevant debate or field, thereby also contributing to the reinforcement of the 
community of persons that already participate in it.  
 
V. Exercising the Imagination 
In the parts above, there have been moments when certain alternatives were offered to those 
features that were identified as characteristic of the relevant layer of philosophical practice. 
Thus, in the case of the outer-outer layer, the possibility of an open-office philosophy 
department was suggested. In the case of the neo-outer layer, the possibility of philosophy 
being communicated by way of mimes, or images, or even sculptures was mooted. The 
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purpose of this part of the paper is to offer more such alternatives. Before going on to do so, 
however, a few preliminary observations can be made.  
 The first of these, and also one that has been reiterated throughout the paper, is that it 
is pertinent to notice that the moment something is described as being in a certain way, or the 
moment that something is identified or revealed or said to exist, is also the moment in which 
it becomes possible to recognise that it need not always be so. In other words, and somewhat 
paradoxically, the moment we put our finger on an ‘is’ is also the moment in which we open 
the possibility that we will recognise it as an ‘ought to be’ or an ‘ought not to be’ – we 
describe or reveal or identify it in a certain way, and, thereafter, create the possibility that we 
will consider whether it ought to be so, or whether it could be changed. For example, if we 
agree that such and such kinds of environments and tools characterise philosophical practice, 
or that this or that kind of body is a philosophical one, or that such and such are features of 
philosophical thinking, then it becomes possible for us to consider the possibility of them not 
being so, i.e., for them not being characteristics of the practice of philosophy in the future. Of 
course, there is always the possibility that we shall not agree on any one description; on any 
one ‘identification.’ But if we do, suddenly, the possibility of change opens itself up.  
 The second and related observation is that even if we do agree on a description or 
identification of a feature, all we do is open up the possibility of change – we still need to 
consider, for example, by whom such a change is likely to be considered seriously and 
respectfully. In the context of the practice of philosophy, then, we could ask: are changes – 
and, in particular, changes to the first three layers – likely to be considered, let alone 
introduced, by those who have had successful careers as philosophers, climbing their way up 
the ladders of academia, attracting grants, prizes and admiration from their fellow 
philosophers and those aspiring to become like them? And if not by them, then by whom are 
such changes likely to be considered or entertained, and perhaps introduced? To what extent 
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can these most difficult changes to entertain and make (changes in the environments and 
tools, and in the corporeal and cerebral habits) come from those who are most familiar with 
them and successful in their use – and, if not to a great extent, then might the entertaining and 
making of those changes be exactly that which we expect from the exercise of the 
imagination?  
 The third and final observation is to become aware of how reluctant a philosophical 
community might be to changes to the first three layers, and how energetically it may attempt 
to keep out those who suggest or even accidentally introduce such changes, or, even worse, 
stigmatise or persecute them. To recognise this is to realise how invisible such denunciations 
may be to members within those communities, and how natural and obvious it may be for 
them to regard those who do not conform as dangerously foreign. Once again, this is likely to 
be the case for those who have lived, and lived successfully, in a certain community. To think, 
suddenly, that what one has considered to be the expressions of one’s most honest and hard-
working efforts of philosophical work have been contingent on certain features one has, up to 
now, never seen before, never even recognised as usual or normal, and to say, ‘here is an 
opportunity for change that I ought to consider seriously and be open to the possibility of 
taking up’ is very difficult indeed. The difficulty of so doing may be the impulse behind 
violent responses to and persecutions of those who threaten that which one has not yet even 
considered be natural and obvious, and thus that which one has not even raised as potentially 
subject to change.  
 Having said this, consider now the following changes to the forms of the components 
of the first three layers. In the case of the first, outer-outer, layer, imagine that or consider the 
possibility that 
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- philosophers were not members of any one university department, but scattered 
throughout other departments, only meeting together occasionally to present 
papers; 
- philosophers worked in glass cubes in the middle of a busy square, where they and 
the results of their inquiries could be observed at will by any passerby; 
- philosophical work was always required to be produced by at least two, and 
preferably more, persons; 
- philosophical work was published only in the form of works exhibited in a gallery 
for a brief period of time; or 
- reviews of philosophical work were required to be done by persons outside the 
literature to which that work was responding. 
 
In the case of the neo-outer layer, imagine that or consider the possibility that 
- philosophers were allowed to philosophise only while moving; 
- philosophers were required to produce works that had to be presented, and could 
only be presented, by persons from other disciplines;  
- philosophical work was not allowed to focus on any one or more elements that the 
philosopher asserted distinguished human beings from animals, but, rather, on all 
the elements that the philosopher asserted human beings have in common with 
animals; or 
- philosophers were required to write their works as if they were plays, and to 
perform them in different characters (different voices, different gestures). 
 
In the case of the neo-inner layer, imagine that or consider the possibility that 
- philosophical work was required to be composed only in one image after another; 
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- philosophical work was praised for its ability to provoke change in corporeal 
habits; 
- philosophical work could only be so called when it showed what could not exist 
and what could not be known;  
- philosophical work had to be composed in the form of questions only; or 
- philosophical work was celebrated for its ability to show the infinite richness of 
expression. 
 
It should be stressed here that these alternatives are not being suggested as beneficial or 
appropriate changes. To treat them in this manner would be to miss the point of offering them. 
The point in offering them is to illustrate the kinds of changes that arise as possible changes, 
having gone through the process of ‘identifying’ features of philosophical practice. It is part 
of the exercise of the imagination to proceed through such a process, but it is even more, and 
much more importantly, an exercise of the imagination to be open to such possibilities – to be 
able and willing to consider them seriously; to be able and willing, in other words, to change, 
and especially to change in those features that one might not yet even had the chance to 
consider as natural and obvious.  
 
Conclusion 
The exercise of the imagination, then, requires us 1) to attempt to describe that which, at first 
blush, appears natural and obvious; 2) to understand that that which appears natural and 
obvious could be otherwise; and 3) to be open to the introduction of changes to that which 
appears natural and obvious. Imagination, in this sense, is quite different to creativity. The 
latter works on the basis of variations of settled phenomena, e.g., existing ideas or 
components or arguments or positions are grouped together differently; what is a problem in 
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one area is introduced as a problem in another; examples or arguments are tweaked at the 
edges. This exercise of creativity is important: for one, it helps sustain life in a certain 
philosophical community. Ultimately, however, it contributes mainly to the stability and 
identity of a philosophical community and reinforces its most firmly established features. 
Imagination, on the other hand, is more difficult, for it strikes at the very heart of that which is 
settled. Changes to that which is settled may not only be resisted, but may also be violently 
opposed. And yet, it is precisely the very ability and willingness to be open to such changes 
that may be of the most ethical and political significance.  
 Already, in the comments above, it is easy to see how the account here, applied to the 
practice of philosophy, might be generalisable, and how this defence of the exercise of the 
imagination as releasing that which is not even yet recognised as natural and obvious, 
widening the realm of possibility, and being open to such changes as are made possible, might 
have broader ethical and political significance. Without the exercise of the imagination as 
argued for here, communities of all kinds may be much more likely to adopt attitudes with 
little time or tolerance for those who do not conform to their ways of life, or to come to 
condemning judgements of practices they cannot understand much more quickly and to 
execute those judgements more persistently and violently.  
 Arendt was right to speak of the ethical and political significance of thoughtfulness, 
and, correlatively, of the dangers of thoughtless. We ought never to underestimate the power 
of all the things we learn, often with great effort, in order to become successful members of 
the many communities that we are simultaneously members of. Nor should we underestimate 
the power of all those things that we have not yet even thought of as natural and obvious, and 
thus all those things that we have not yet granted the chance to become contingent. If we 
remain alert, then we will also not confine the exercise of the imagination to the realm of 
creativity, for that realm, at least as presented here, is one better characterised by variation-
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making in ways that reinforce, rather than question, the stability of relations and expectations. 
Having said that, it is important to acknowledge that there is nothing inherently good about 
the exercise of the imagination, and certainly nothing inherently bad about creativity. 
Ultimately, a balance will have to be struck between the stabilising tendencies of creativity 
and the de-stabilising tendencies of the imagination. However, if we are to err on the side of 
caution, we ought also to recognise that there are already a great many strategies, techniques 
and opportunities for reinforcing the familiar, for repeating that which we have always found 
problematic and insightful, for surrounding ourselves with mirrors that make us feel good and 
for avoiding or persecuting that which we see as threats to our conception of ourselves and 
our ways of life. In that respect, exercising the imagination may well be more important.  
  
  
 
 
 
 
